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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
THE STATE OF UTAH, : 
Plaintiff/Appellee, : 
v. : 
PATRICK HENRY VALDEZ, : Case No. 20070614-CA 
Defendant/Appellant. : Appellant is incarcerated. 
JURISDICTIONAL STATEMENT 
This is an appeal from a judgment of conviction for Theft by Receiving Stolen 
Property, a third degree felony, in violation of Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-408 (2003); 
Attempted Burglary, a third degree felony, in violation of Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-202 
(2003); Forgery, a third degree felony, in violation of Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-501 (2003); 
and two counts of Attempted Theft by Receiving Stolen Property, third degree felonies, in 
violation of Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-408 (2003), in the Third Judicial District Court, in 
and for Salt Lake County, State of Utah, the Honorable Deno Himonas, presiding. 
Jurisdiction is conferred upon this Court pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 78-2a-3(2)(j) 
(2002). S>ee Addendum A (Sentence, Judgment, and Commitment).1 
A copy of the Sentence, Judgment, and Commitment from each of the five cases has 
been included in Addendum A. 
ISSUE AND STANDARD OF REVIEW 
Point. Whether the trial court abused its discretion by consecutively imposing Mr. 
Valdez's five terms of 0-5 years in prison where the state and presentence report 
recommended concurrent sentences. 
Standard of Review: This Court reviews sentences for an abuse of discretion. 
State v. Wright, 893 P.2d 1113,1120 (Utah Ct. App. 1995). "'An abuse of discretion 
may be manifest if the actions of the judge in sentencing were "inherently unfair" or if the 
judge imposed a "clearly excessive" sentence.'" State v. Elm, 808 P.2d 1097, 1099 (Utah 
1991) (citation omitted). 
Preservation: This issue was preserved below. R. 55:5; 43. 
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES, AND RULES 
The text of the following relevant provision is provided in full in Addendum B: 
Utah Code Ann. § 76-3-401 (2003). 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
This appeal is a consolidation of the five following cases: On June 6, 2006, in case 
number 061907518 ("7518"), Mr. Valdez was charged by Information with Forgery, a 
third degree felony, in violation of Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-501; Purchase, Transfer, 
Possession or Use of a Dangerous Weapon by a Restricted Person, a class A 
Five copies of the sentencing hearing were inadvertently requested and made part of the 
record. For ease of reference, Appellant cites to only the hearing record numbered "55" 
when referring to the sentencing hearing. 
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misdemeanor, in violation of Utah Code Ann. § 76-10-503(3)(b); Attempted Theft by 
Deception, a class B misdemeanor, in violation of Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-405; Theft by 
Receiving Stolen Property, a class B misdemeanor, in violation of Utah Code Ann. § 76-
6-408; and Unlawful Possession of Drug Paraphernalia, a class B misdemeanor, in 
violation of Utah Code Ann. § 58-37a-5. R. (7518): 1-4. On July 20, 2006, in case 
number 061904724 ("724"), Mr. Valdez was charged by Information with Theft by 
Receiving Stolen Property, a third degree felony, in violation of Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-
408; and Theft by Deception, a class B misdemeanor, in violation of Utah Code Ann. § 
76-6-405. R. (724):2-3. 
On September 7, 2007, in case number 061905899 ("899"), Mr. Valdez was 
charged by Information with Burglary, a second degree felony, in violation of Utah Code 
Ann. § 76-6-202; Theft, a class A misdemeanor, in violation of Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-
404; and Criminal Mischief, a class B misdemeanor, in violation of Utah Code Ann. § 76-
6-106. R. (899):2-4. On October 12, 2006, in case number 061906778 ("778"), Mr. 
Valdez was charged by Information with Theft by Receiving Stolen Property, a second 
degree felony, in violation of Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-408. On November 13, 2006, in 
case number 07901234 ("234"), Mr. Valdez was charged by Information with Theft by 
Receiving Stolen Property, a second degree felony, in violation of Utah Code Ann. § 76-
6-408; and Failure to Respond to an Officer's Signal to Stop, a third degree felony, in 
violation of Utah Code Ann. § 41-6a-210. R. (234):l-3. 
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On April 20, 2007, Mr. Valdez entered a guilty plea to Forgery, a third degree 
felony (R.( 7518):35); Theft by Receiving Stolen Property, a third degree felony (R. 
(724):39); an amended charge of Attempted Burglary, a third degree felony (R. (899):31); 
an amended charge of Attempted Theft by Receiving Stolen Property, a third degree 
felony (R. (234):79); and an amended charge of Attempted Theft by Receiving Stolen 
Property, a third degree felony (R. (778):32). A presentence report was ordered and 
prepared for sentencing purposes. R. 43. 
On June 22, 2007, the trial court imposed 5 indeterminate terms of zero to five 
years in the Utah State Prison, consecutively. R. 55:8-9; see also R. (7518):46-47; 
(723):44-45; (899):42-43; (234):90-91; (778):41-42. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
On April 20, 2007, Mr. Valdez entered a guilty plea to Forgery, a third degree 
felony (R. (7518):35); Theft by Receiving Stolen Property, a third degree felony (R. 
(724):39); an amended charge of Attempted Burglary, a third degree felony (R. (899):31); 
an amended charge of Attempted Theft by Receiving Stolen Property, a third degree 
felony (R. (234):79); and an amended charge of Attempted Theft by Receiving Stolen 
Property, a third degree felony (R. (778):32). A presentence report was ordered and 
prepared for sentencing purposes. R. 43; see Addendum C. 
On June 22, 2007, a hearing was held for Mr. Valdez to be sentenced in all five 
cases. R. 55. During the sentencing hearing, defense counsel argued that the trial court 
4 
should follow the presentence reports recommendation of concurrent sentences. R. 55:5, 
8. The presentence report prepared by Adult Probation and Parole (AP & P) 
recommended Mr. Valdez be sentenced to prison "for the terms prescribed by law, to be 
served concurrently . . . ." R. 43:2. Initially, the presentence investigator "had empathy 
for [Mr. Valdez] and thought he should be given one chance at probation with treatment" 
but because the offenses involved victims, the investigator thought concurrent sentences 
were more appropriate. R. 43:3. 
Defense counsel argued that while he was not going to attempt to minimize Mr. 
Valdez's lengthy criminal record, Mr. Valdez's attitude throughout these cases should be 
taken into consideration. R. 55:3. Mr. Valdez has expressed deep remorse during the 
course of the proceedings for his actions. R. 43; 55:3-5. Counsel argued that Mr. Valdez 
"ha[d] taken a level of responsibility that quite frankly [he has] not seen before, and a 
level of self awareness about what his problem is and what needs to happen that [he 
thought was] very, very rare." R. 55:3. Mr. Valdez's focus throughout the proceedings 
has not been to avoid serving time for the offenses but to receive help to overcome his 
drug addiction which he cannot do on his own. R. 55:3-5. 
The prosecutor "agree[d] with the recommendation" of concurrent sentences. R. 
55:5. The prosecutor stated that although he was recommending prison in an attempt to 
protect the community, imposing the sentences concurrently was appropriate given Mr. 
Valdez's attitude towards the offenses he has committed. R. 55:6. The trial court then 
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imposed indeterminate zero to five year terms in prison in all five cases. R. 55:8. The 
trial court stated that given Mr. Valdez's "extensive criminal history, and the fact that 
these [were] all separate criminal episodes" he was ordering the terms to run 
consecutively for a term of zero to twenty-five years. R. 55:8-9. 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
The trial court abused its discretion when it imposed consecutive sentences 
without considering all of the statutory factors mandated under Utah law. The presentence 
report requested and prepared on Mr. Valdez considered all of the statutory factors and 
recommended concurrent sentences. Instead of following the presentence report's 
recommendation or explaining why it was deviating from that recommendation, the trial 
court imposed consecutive sentences citing only to Mr. Valdez's criminal history and that 
the offenses were separate criminal episodes. The trial court's failure to consider the 
mandatory factors before imposing consecutive sentences, failure to articulate its reason 
for deviating from the presentence report's recommendation, and its failure to consider 
Mr. Valdez's rehabilitative needs was an abuse of discretion. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT. THE TRIAL COURT ABUSED ITS DISCRETION IN 
SENTENCING MR. VALDEZ TO CONSECUTIVE TERMS OF 
IMPRISONMENT WITHOUT PROPERLY CONSIDERING THE 
STATUTORY FACTORS AS REQUIRED UNDER UTAH CODE ANN. 76-
3-401(2) (2003). 
A trial court abuses its discretion when it "'fails to consider all legally relevant 
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[sentencing] factors/" State v. McCovey, 803 P.2d 1234, 1235 (Utah 1990) (quoting 
State v. Gibbons, 779 P.2d 1133,1135 (Utah 1989) (footnote omitted)), or when the trial 
judge fails to give '"adequate weight to certain mitigating circumstances.'" State v. 
Helms, 2002 UT 12, [^15, 40 P.3d 626 (quoting State v. Galli, 967 P.2d 930, 938 (Utah 
1998)). A trial court's "[a]buse of discretion 'may be manifest if the actions of the judge 
in sentencing were "inherently unfair" or if the judge imposed a "clearly excessive 
sentence.'"" State v. Schweitzer, 943 P.2d 649, 651 (Utah 1997)(citations omitted). This 
Court will find a trial court has abused its discretion when it concludes that "no 
reasonable [person] would take the view adopted by the trial court." Id, (quotation and 
citation omitted). 
Trial courts are required to consider statutory factors and address 
recommendations in the presentence report before imposing a sentence for more than one 
felony offense. See State v. Perez, 2002 UT App 211, «|[48, 52 P.3d 451. Utah Code Ann. 
§ 76-3-401 (2003), outlines the legally relevant sentencing factors a trial court is 
mandated to consider before determining whether sentences will be imposes concurrently 
or consecutively. Utah's appellate courts have noted that "[concurrent sentences are 
favored over consecutive ones." Perez, 2002 UT App 211 at ^43 (citations omitted). 
Utah Code Ann. § 76-3-401 states in part the following: 
(1) A court shall determine, if a defendant has been adjudged guilty of 
more than one felony offense, whether to impose concurrent or consecutive 
sentences for the offenses. The court shall state on the record and shall 
indicate in the order of judgment and commitment: 
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(a) if the sentences imposed are to run concurrently or consecutively 
to each other; . . . 
(2) In determining whether stale offenses are to run concurrently or 
consecutively, the court shall consider the gravity and circumstances of the 
offenses, the number of victims, and the history, character, and 
rehabilitative needs of the defendant. 
Utah Code Ann. § 76-3-401(1) - (2). 
Among other things, the statute requires that the trial judge consider the 
"rehabilitative needs of the defendant." Id. For example, in State v. Smith, 909 P.2d 236 
(Utah 1995) (Smith II), the defendant was convicted of aggravated kidnapping, rape of a 
child, and two counts of sodomy on a child. Id. at 238. The trial court imposed 
consecutive sentences because the crimes were heinous, the defendant was a pedophile, 
and although the defendant's own victimization as a child was a mitigating factor, he was 
responsible to get help for himself. Id at 244. Our supreme court held the sentence was 
an abuse of discretion because the trial court ignored the rehabilitative needs of the 
defendant. IcL at 244-45. 
An additional and highly important factor in deciding whether to impose 
consecutive or concurrent sentences is that the Legislature, in enacting 
indeterminate sentencing laws, has opted to give the Board of Pardons wide 
latitude in deciding what a maximum sentence ought to be. State v. Strunk, 
846 P.2d 1297, 1301 (Utah 1993). The Board is in a far better position than 
a court to monitor a defendant's subsequent behavior and possible progress 
toward rehabilitation while in prison and to adjust the maximum sentence 
accordingly.... While the trial court imposed the greatest minimum 
mandatory sentences possible under the law, and justifiably so, we think it 
unreasonable and an abuse of discretion to have imposed essentially a 
minimum mandatory life sentence and thereby deprive the Board of Pardons 
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of discretion to take into account defendant's future conduct and possible 
progress toward rehabilitation. 
Id. at 244-45 (citation omitted). 
Similarly, in GalH, the defendant was convicted of three counts of aggravated 
robbery, absconded, and lived in Minnesota for three years before being sentenced. See 
Galli, 967 P.2d at 932. Our supreme court held the trial court abused its discretion by 
ordering consecutive sentences because: (1) although the defendant's crimes were 
serious, the record showed the trial court may not have "given adequate weight to certain 
mitigating circumstances," including the fact that the defendant "did not inflict any 
physical injuries/' only used a "pellet gun," and took a "relatively small" amount of 
money; (2) the defendant's history consisted only of "minor traffic offenses and one 
misdemeanor theft conviction," and his act of absconding only provided "nominal 
support" since he was not charged with bail jumping; (3) although the defendant's 
"offenses and flight from justice reflected] negatively on his character," he "voluntarily 
confessed and admitted responsibility," "expressed a commitment and hope to improve 
himself," and, while in Minnesota, "obeyed the law, helped his neighbors, and was a 
productive individual;" and (4) concurrent sentencing "better serv[ed]" his "rehabilitative 
needs by allowing the Board of Pardons and Parole to release him from prison after five 
years if he has shown genuine progress toward rehabilitation." Id at 938; see Stmnk, 846 
P.2d at 1301-02 (holding trial court abused discretion by sentencing 16-year-old 
convicted of murder, child kidnapping, aggravated sexual abuse of a child to consecutive 
sentences even though diagnostic report recommended "long period of imprisonment" 
because trial court's sentence assured defendant "would spend a minimum of twenty-four 
years in prison," failed to "sufficiently consider defendant's rehabilitative needs in light 
of his extreme youth and the absence of prior violent crimes," and "rob[bed] the Board of 
Pardons of any flexibility to parole [defendant] sooner"). 
Conversely, in State v. Schweitzer, 943 P.2d 649 (Utah Ct. App. 1997), the 
defendant was convicted of aggravated assault and stalking. Id. at 649. On appeal, the 
defendant argued the trial court abused its discretion by sentencing him to consecutive 
terms because it failed to consider that the defendant was "never known to be violent, 
ha[d] never been convicted of a violent crime, was under the influence of drugs and 
alcohol at the time of the stabbing, and was remorseful." IdL at 651-52. This Court ruled 
the trial court did not abuse its discretion because the mitigating evidence highlighted by 
the defendant was presented to the trial court and the record was "replete with evidence 
supporting the trial court's finding that defendant is 'a clear and present danger' and 
supporting its order in favor of incarceration rather than rehabilitation." Li at 652. The 
trial court "specifically noted that on the night of the stabbing, defendant went to a public 
place carrying a concealed weapon, he voluntarily over-medicated himself, voluntarily 
got drunk, indiscriminately used the weapon 'with abandonment,' and put the restaurant 
diners, employees, and his friend at risk." Id. Moreover, the defendant "failed to make 
an effort in his own rehabilitation," despite several opportunities. IcL This Court 
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distinguished the defendant's case from Strunk and Smith II because the defendant was 
only sentenced to "two-to-five years in prison and six months in jail." Id. Consequently, 
the trial court's sentence did not remove the Board's ability to monitor the defendant's 
rehabilitative progress. Id. 
In this case, the trial court abused its discretion by imposing consecutive sentences 
without adequately considering Mr. Valdez's character and rehabilitative needs. The 
presentence report included Mr. Valdez's feelings about the offenses he had committed 
stating that he felt "[r]egreat [sic], remorse, shame and sorry!" R. 43:2. The motivation 
for Mr. Valdez in committing these offenses was "[m]oney for drugs. Heroin" but he 
wanted to take responsibility yet he needed help with his addiction. R. 43:2. 
I've always done time. Never a program. Can't blame society. I blame 
myself. I'm a victim of my own circumstances. I've dug myself a hol[e]. 
It's time to stop digging. I feel if I hadn't gotten arrested I would be dead. 
If I don't get help now, I probably never will. I know it's that time in my 
life. 
R. 43:2. 
The presentence report included Mr. Valdez's statement regarding his addiction 
and his desperate plea for help dealing with it. R. 43:2. 
At age 17 went to state re-form school, at age 18 I went to prison. I was in 
prison until I was 24 years old. S[i]nce then I've been in and out of prison 
for the last 20 years. I first started doing her[oi]n while in prison. It 
became my drug of choice and my addiction and cause to commit crimes for 
money to buy more her[oi]n, which has lead me to where I am today which 
is in jail again. 
I'm not a stranger to doing time. If I thought I couldn't make it, I'd say just 
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send me to prison. (In prison) now it's just a waste of time because I don't 
get help. My problem is being outside. I never believed I was 
institutionalized. I just thought it was a word, but I think that has something 
to do with it. My problem is trying to adapt to society. It sounds good on 
paper, but when I get out I feel really lost. When you come into prison, you 
spend time at R & O and it helps you adjust. There's nothing going out. 
R. 43:2-3. 
The presentence investigator stated that she "had empathy for [Mr. Valdez] and 
thought he should be given one chance at probation with treatment" R. 43:3. However, 
the investigator felt that because Mr. Valdez "repeatedly committed offenses against 
society and specifically, random innocent individuals to support his drug habit" it 
recommended his sentences be imposed concurrently. R. 43:3. During the sentencing 
hearing the defense attorney acknowledged that Mr. Valdez has a lengthy criminal record 
which has kept him "mostly in prison for the last - coming up on 40 years." R. 55:2. But 
defense counsel asked the court to focus on Mr. Valdez's attitude and desire for help with 
his lifelong addiction. R. 55:3. 
[Sjince I first met him, he has never - not even mentioned the possibility of 
getting out of jail. He's never asked to be out of jail. He told me from the 
very first time I met him, "I am a drug addict. I need to be in jail. I want 
help. Please get me help." 
He has taken a level of responsibility that quite frankly I have not 
seen before, and a level of self av/areness about what his problem is and 
what needs to happen that I think is very, very rare. He's never complained. 
He's never (inaudible) delays of this. 
He's just taken it all in stride and said to me consistently, "That's 
fine. I need to be in jail right now. I need to be clean. Please get me some 
help. I've never had help. I've never had a program. I get out, you know, 
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into the world. I get -things get stressful, and I fall right back into drugs 
every single time." 
R. 55:3-4. 
The state agreed with AP & P's recommendation of concurrent sentences. R. 55:5. 
The prosecutor felt that concurrent sentences were appropriate in Mr. Valdez5 s case 
given "his attitude." R. 55:6. The state also thought it was important that the parole board 
have the power to "decide how well [Mr. Valdez is] doing in terms of his drug habit." R. 
55:6. 
In sentencing Mr. Valdez, the trial court imposed five indeterminate terms of zero 
to five in each of the cases. R. 55:8. The trial court ordered the five terms to run 
consecutively, citing Mr. Valdez5s lengthy criminal history, "and the fact that these 
[were] all separate criminal episodes.55 R. 55:8. The trial court concluded that Mr. 
Valdez was "to serve zero to twenty-five years at the Utah State Prison as a result.55 R. 
55:8-9. While citing to Mr. Valdez5s criminal history and separate criminal episodes as 
support for imposition of consecutive sentences, the trial court completely failed to 
explain why it was ignoring the recommendations of AP & P, which after interviewing 
and researching Mr. Valdez5s background initially was going to recommend "probation 
with treatment" but later determined that given that he committed offenses which 
involved "random innocent individuals55 in order to support his drug habit, recommended 
concurrent sentences. Nor does the trial court address Mr. Valdez5s rehabilitative 
potential from a life long addiction to drugs, especially since this was the motive behind 
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the theft offenses or the fact that the state agreed with imposing the sentences 
concurrently, given Mr. Valdez's attitude. 
A presentence report contains detailed information regarding the mandated 
statutory factors a trial court is required to consider and is meant to assist a trial court in 
exercising its discretion properly when imposing sentence. See State v. Helms, 2002 UT 
12 at *p3. This is because a "presentence report contains detailed information regarding 
not only the 'gravity and circumstances of the offenses,' but also the 'history, character, 
and rehabilitative needs of the defendant.5" Id. In Helms, the supreme court determined 
that although a trial court's sentencing order may not "state to what extent it considered 
each of the statutory factors at the sentencing hearing" a trial court's review of the 
presentence report evidences that a trial court considered the relevant statutory factors 
necessary. Id. at ^ }13. 
This Court has stated that when a trial court deviates from the recommendations of 
AP&P without explanation and imposes consecutive sentences without record evidence to 
indicate that all of the statutory factors had been considered, an abuse of discretion 
occurs. Perez, 2002 UT App 211 at f48. In Perez, the defendant had been convicted of 
aggravated burglary, a first degree felony and attempted murder, a second degree felony. 
Id. at •pO. On appeal, Perez argued, inter alia, that the trial court abused its discretion by 
imposing consecutive prison terms without considering all of the required statutory 
factors. Id. at [^42. The presentence report prepared on Perez had recommended that he 
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serve concurrent prison terms and the prosecutor had agreed with that recommendation. 
Id. at ^[44-45. In imposing sentencing, the trial court noted that it had heard the evidence 
and found that Perez's conduct in committing these offenses was "egregious." Id. at ^45. 
After briefly touching on the "gravity and circumstances of the offense" the trial court 
sentenced Perez to serve his terms of imprisonment consecutively. Id, at ^ 4 3 , 45. This 
Court determined that "[t]he trial court's brief commentary dealt only with the 'gravity 
and circumstances of the offenses,' and did not explicitly address the presentence report's 
recommendation of concurrent sentences." Id at [^48. Nothing in the record indicated 
that the trial court "'considered] the . . . history, character, and rehabilitative needs of the 
defendant in determining whether to impose consecutive sentences.5" Id. (citation 
omitted) (alteration in original). 
As seen in Perez, trial courts often focus their sentencing decisions based on their 
consideration of the "gravity and circumstances of the offense" alone, and often fail to 
adequately evaluate the other statutory factors. Often an abuse of discretion can be found 
because of a trial court's failure to consider the rehabilitative needs of a defendant. 
Like the trial courts in Smith II and Galli, the trial court in this case failed to 
consider Mr. Valdez's character or rehabilitative needs and removed from the Board of 
Pardons and Parole the opportunity to monitor Mr. Valdez's rehabilitation and decide his 
rehabilitative needs if he continued to show improvement through an appropriate 
treatment program. Also, like the trial court in Perez, the trial court abused its discretion 
15 
by deviating from the state's and presentence report's recommendation without 
considering all of the statutory factors and imposing consecutive sentences in this case 
where it is clearly unfair and excessive. 
CONCLUSION 
This Court should reverse because the trial court abused its discretion by imposing 
five consecutive terms of zero to five years in prison without considering all of the 
statutory factors and imposing consecutive sentences that were clearly unfair and 
excessive. 
SUBMITTED this J 5 day of January, 2008. 
"DEBRA M. NELSON 
PATRICK W. CORUM 
Attorneys for Defendant/Appellant 
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SENTENCE PRISON 
Based on the defendant's conviction of ATTEMPTED THEFT BY RECEIVING 
STOLEN PROPERTY a 3rd Degree Felony, the defendant is sentenced to 
an indeterminate term of not to exceed five years in the Utah State 
Prison. 
COMMITMENT is to begin immediately. 
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TabB 
Utah Code Ann. § 76-3-401 (2003) 
76-3-401. Concurrent or consecutive sentences - Limitations - Definition. 
(1) A court shall determine, if a defendant has been adjudged guilty of more than one 
felony offense, whether to impose concurrent or consecutive sentences for the offenses. 
The court shall state on the record and shall indicate in the order of judgment and 
commitment: 
(a) if the sentences imposed are to run concurrently or consecutively to each other; 
and 
(b) if the sentences before the court are to run concurrently or consecutively with any 
other sentences the defendant is already serving. 
(2) In determining whether state offenses are to run concurrently or consecutively, the 
court shall consider the gravity and circumstances of the offenses, the number of victims, 
and the history, character, and rehabilitative needs of the defendant. 
(3) The court shall order that sentences for state offenses run consecutively if the later 
offense is committed while the defendant is imprisoned or on parole, unless the court 
finds and states on the record that consecutive sentencing would be inappropriate. 
(4) If a written order of commitment does not clearly state whether the sentences are 
to run consecutively or concurrently, the Board of Pardons and Parole shall request 
clarification from the court. Upon receipt of the request, the court shall enter a clarified 
order of commitment stating whether the sentences are to run consecutively or 
concurrently. 
(5) A court may impose consecutive sentences for offenses arising out of a single 
criminal episode as defined in Section 76-1-401. 
(6) (a) If a court imposes consecutive sentences, the aggregate maximum of all 
sentences imposed may not exceed 30 years imprisonment, except as provided under 
Subsection (6)(b). 
(b) The limitation under Subsection (6)(a) does not apply if: 
(i) an offense for which the defendant is sentenced authorizes the death penalty or a 
maximum sentence of life imprisonment; or 
(ii) the defendant is convicted of an additional offense based on conduct which occurs 
after his initial sentence or sentences are imposed. 
(7) The limitation in Subsection (6)(a) applies if a defendant: 
(a) is sentenced at the same time for more than one offense; 
(b) is sentenced at different times for one or more offenses, all of which were 
committed prior to imposition of the defendant's initial sentence; or 
(c) has already been sentenced by a court of this state other than the present sentencing 
court or by a court of another state or federal jurisdiction, and the conduct giving rise to 
the present offense did not occur after his initial sentencing by any other court. 
(8) When the limitation of Subsection (6)(a) applies, determining the effect of 
consecutive sentences and the manner in which they shall be served, the Board of 
Pardons and Parole shall treat the defendant as though he has been committed for a single 
term that consists of the aggregate of the validly imposed prison terms as follows: 
(a) if the aggregate maximum term exceeds the 30-year limitation, the maximum 
sentence is considered to be 30 years; and 
(b) when indeterminate sentences run consecutively, the minimum term, if any, 
constitutes the aggregate of the validly imposed minimum terms. 
(9) When a sentence is imposed or sentences are imposed to run concurrently with the 
other or with a sentence presently being served, the term that provides the longer 
remaining imprisonment constitutes the time to be served. 
(10) This section may not be construed to restrict the number or length of individual 
consecutive sentences that may be imposed or to affect the validity of any sentence so 
imposed, but only to limit the length of sentences actually served under the commitments. 
(11) This section may not be construed to limit the authority of a court to impose 
consecutive sentences in misdemeanor cases. 
(12) As used in this section, "imprisoned" means sentenced and committed to a secure 
correctional facility as defined in Section 64-13-1, the sentence has not been terminated 
or voided, and the person is not on parole, regardless of where the person is located. 
Amended by Chapter 129, 2002 General Session 
History: C. 1953, 76-3-401, enacted by L, added "When the limitation of Subsection (6)(a) 
1973, ch. 196, § 76-3-401; 1974, ch. 32, § 7; applies" at the beginning of Subsection (8); and 
1989, ch. 181, § 1; 1994, ch. 13, § 21; 1995, made stylistic changes. 
ch. 139, § 1; 1997, ch. 283, § 1; 1999, ch. 275, The 2002 amendment, effective July 1, 2002, 
§ 1; 2002, ch. 129, § 1. divided former Subsection (1) into Subsections 
Amendment Notes. — The 1999 amend- (1) and (2); in Subsection (1) added the second 
ment, effective May 3,1999,. subdivided Subsec- sentence and added Subsections (l)(a) and 
tion (6), added Subsection (6)(b)(ii), and made (l)(b); deleted former Subsection (4) and added 
related changes; substituted "of the defendant's the language to Subsection (2); deleted "has 
initial sentence" for "of sentence for any one or reason to believe that the later offense occurred 
more of them" in Subsection (7)(b); added "and while the person was imprisoned or on parole 
the conduct giving rise to the present offense for the earlier offense" following "Board of Par-
did not occur after his initial sentencing by any dons and Parole" in Subsection (4); and made 
other court" at the end of Subsection (7)(c); related and stylistic changes. 
